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The purpose of this thesis is to explore the applicability of the principle of discrimination in 
Afghanistan. Two research questions seeks to find out whether it is possible to draw a 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants in Afghanistan, and whether it is possible 
to prepare soldier for difficult situations arising when making this distinction. Just war theory 
is used as a basis for the analytical framework. The study concludes that the traditional group-
based criteria for distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants in conflicts are not 
applicable in Afghanistan. Based on Larrys May’s interpretation of just war theory I suggest 
that a distinction in insurgency conflicts should rather be based on a behaviour-based 
approach, as this approach proves more successful in Afghanistan today.  
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An old English proverb claims that all is fair in love and war. For war at least, this is not 
entirely true. Governing conduct in war has been attempted for as long as wars have been 
fought. Whether this has been successful or not is another matter. Rules in war have existed as 
long as war itself, but it was not until the 19th Century that laws governing the conduct of war 
became internationally binding. Henry Dunant initiated the process of developing a legal 
framework for conduct in war after the battle of Solferinol in 1859. Since then, important 
international legislation has been developed and recognised by most states in the world. This 
thesis will deal with one of the most important principles of warfare, the principle of 
discrimination.  
The principle of discrimination seeks to distinguish between those who are liable for attack in 
war, and those who are not. This also entails that it draws a line between those who have the 
right to use force, and those who do not. Drawing this distinction is more complicated than it 
sounds and the question of how to define combatants stands at the core of the principles 
problem as international and non-international armed conflicts have become increasingly 
more complex. The aim of this thesis is to explore how soldiers apply this principle in 
unconventional conflicts where the lines between combatants and non-combatants are often 
undetermined and blurred.  
 
1.1 Purpose of the study and research question 
The Afghan conflict is a conflict of insurgency. Such conflicts are characterised by blurred 
lines between those who take part in hostilities, and those who refrain. Respecting 
international law however means distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants in 
warfare. Making this distinction in Afghanistan is a challenge for the International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF), as the insurgents are known to blend in with the civilian population 
to avoid detection. The purpose of this study is twofold; first, it will explore whether the 
principle of discrimination is applicable in the conflict in Afghanistan. I will do so by 
comparing the criteria for distinction, as discussed and interpreted in just war theory (JWT) 
and international humanitarian law (IHL), with the criteria used by the Norwegian Armed 
Forces to draw such a distinction in Afghanistan; secondly, I will explore whether it is 
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possible to prepare soldiers for the moral dilemmas they may face when drawing such a 
distinction in insurgency conflicts. The thought behind this is to explore how and whether the 
soldiers’ ethical education can be improved and adjusted to counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations. As this is a small-n study, the aim is to obtain thick and holistic descriptions that 
will lead to a better understanding of international humanitarian law and just war theory’s 
relevance (or lack thereof) in the Afghanistan conflict, and possibly in COIN operations in 
general.  
From the stated purposes above, the research questions are as follows 
1. Is it possible to distinguish combatants from non-combatants in Afghanistan? 
2. Is it possible to prepare soldiers for the task of drawing a distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants in COIN operations? 
Using IHL and JWT as a foundation for my analytical framework I will address the following 
questions in order to answer the above research questions;  
o How, if possible, do Norwegian Armed Forces distinguish between combatants and 
non-combatants in Afghanistan? 
o Which indicators are the Norwegian Armed Forces using when detecting enemies, and 
how do these match indicators used for distinction in IHL and JWT?  
o Does pre-deployment training match the challenges Armed Forces encounter in 
Afghanistan?  
 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
The next chapter Research methods will discuss the methodological aspects in this thesis. It 
will especially focus on the challenges concerning the choice of case study as a research 
method, and the use of qualitative interviews as a method for data gathering. It will also 
discuss issues concerning the evaluation of qualitative research, notably the reliability and 
validity of the study. Chapter 3 Background, will give a presentation of the chosen case. I will 
describe the Norwegian Armed Forces’ role in Afghanistan, and present the nature of the 
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conflict. In chapter 4 Just war theory and analytical framework, I will present the main 
features of just war theory, and a presentation of the principle of discrimination in just war 
theory and international humanitarian law. I will also present a framework for analysis where 
I use just war theory and international humanitarian law to discover indicators for identifying 
and distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. This theoretical framework will 
be applied in chapter 5 Findings and analysis. The last chapter, Conclusions and implications, 
will summarize the main findings of the study as well as present the theoretical and practical 



























2 Research Methods  
This chapter will focus on research methods in political science, and the methods used in this 
study. It will discuss the methodological choices that have been made here, especially the use 
of case study research and qualitative interviews, as these are essentials for my research 
design. The last part of the chapter is devoted to research ethics as well as a discussion of the 
validity and reliability of the study. 
 
2.1 Research design 
The Law of Armed Conflict was made with conventional warfare in mind. One of the central 
elements is that there should be a clear distinction between combatants and civilians, giving 
only the former the right to use force, and at the same time protecting civilians from the 
torments of war. This is known as the principle of discrimination or distinction1. The principle 
is however open to interpretations with regard to who belong to which of the groups 
combatants and civilians. Since the establishment of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 and its 
subsequent additions in 1977, there have been more unconventional warfare than 
conventional wars, a term associated with the First and Second World Wars. As such, the 
question of whether the principle of discrimination is applicable in unconventional warfare 
becomes relevant.  
All research methods have their advantages and disadvantages, and choosing a method for a 
study is based on how to best answer the initial research question. This study aims to explore 
the applicability of the principle of discrimination in unconventional wars; more precisely 
whether it is possible to apply this principle in the current conflict in Afghanistan. Little 
research has focused on this before; a qualitative approach that allows for an exploratory 
approach is therefore suitable. This gives the researcher the opportunity to change course 
during the study as he or she learns more about the field, or if more relevant data are 
discovered. For this study a case study design is particularly suitable as such designs give the 
researcher the opportunity to seek detailed knowledge about a phenomenon delimited in space 
and time (Gerring, 2007).  
                                                
1	  I will use the term discrimination in this thesis. 	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2.2 Case study Research 
Case studies within political science were long regarded as secondary to statistical methods, 
which is considered not only as providing more precise measurements, but also a clearly 
specified scope for generalisation. However, as this positivist view has somewhat faded it has 
in recent years become natural to regard case studies as an effective method of research. For, 
where statistics can determine causal effects between variables, case studies, as Gerring 
(2007:49) points out will allow the researcher to undertake thick and holistic investigations 
which can explain these causal effects. Such a study, he continues (Ibid:19-20) may be the 
study of an event, a phenomenon or an instance with spatial or temporal boundaries.  
 
2.3 Case selection 
There are several reasons for narrowing down the focus in research. Perhaps the most 
important one is that one cannot possibly cover all aspects of an issue. This is particularly true 
here, as this thesis offers limited space for discussion. I have chosen to study the principle of 
discriminations applicability in the Afghan conflict. To answer the research questions I use 
qualitative interviews as a method for collecting data. This automatically narrows down the 
case, as the number of interviews, and the availability of interview objects limits the study’s 
scope. In order to answer the research questions, the unit that will be studied is ISAF. This 
alone poses a number of methodological challenges. First of all, there are 42 contributing 
nations to ISAF (NATO, 2009). Seeing ISAF as an entity is therefore not possible as the 
varying levels of activity, different institutional cultures, and the difference in which Afghan 
region they are operating in are great. Studying the Norwegian contribution to ISAF is a 
natural choice as I am based in Norway and have limited resources to travel both in terms of 
finances and time, as this is a master’s thesis and a rather small project. The six informants I 
interviewed, but one lived in proximity to Oslo. As both the war college, the Norwegian 
Defence University College, and the Armed Forces administrative headquarters2 are placed in 
Oslo, narrowing the search for informants to this area seemed logical.  
                                                
2	  The Norwegian Joint Headquarters are based in Bodø.  
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As well as narrowing the scope of objects to study, it is also logical to limit the temporal 
scope of the study. The first Norwegian contingent to ISAF deployed in 2003. Today the 
contingent consists of 525 military personnel.3 Approximately 300 of these are based in 
Maymanah, in the Faryab province where Norway commands one of ISAF’s Provincial 
Construction Teams. The remaining personnel are split between the National Contingent 
Command (NCC) and the National Support Element (NSE) in Mazar-e-Sharif, and 
Commander ISAF (COMISAF) in Kabul (NATO, 2011).4  
The Norwegian forces were first deployed to Maymanah in 2006. That is also the year where 
the coalition forces started to experience a growing resistance in Afghanistan. This led to 
more combat situations for Norwegian Armed Forces, and thus more situations where 
dilemmas concerning how to apply the principle of discrimination. From November 2009, 
NATO activated the NATO- training mission in Afghanistan. NATO’s stated aim for the 
mission is to train Afghan security forces and to support capability development, so that they 
will be able to maintain the country’s security once ISAF forces withdraw in 2014. The 
Norwegian Armed Forces have been a part of this training mission, and as the Afghans have 
gained more and more control over the operations, the Norwegian Armed Forces have taken 
on a role of mentoring. This has led to fewer combat situations for the Norwegian Armed 
Forces as the Afghan security forces have mainly carried out these missions. Consequently, 
this has led me to limit the temporal boundaries for the study to the years 2006-2010.  
 
2.4 Qualitative Interviews 
Qualitative interviews are widely used within case studies as they give the researcher the 
opportunity to obtain deep knowledge of an issue through informants who often have first-
hand experiences of the phenomenon in question. Qualitative semi-structured interviews are 
used in this study because it is essential to comprehend a person’s thoughts and reflections 
about the difficulties with applying the principal of discrimination in Afghanistan. Such 
knowledge can be obtained through in-depth interviews – not through structured interviews, 
as structured interviews does not allow for the respondents to elaborate on issues that can lead 
                                                
3	  As of May 2012. See http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/norway/index.php.	  	  
4	  Numbers do not include Special Operations Forces.	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to a better understanding of the phenomenon. Obtaining much and detailed information about 
the phenomenon is thus the greatest advantage of this method. One of its drawbacks is that the 
selection of informants makes it hard to compare answers due to the partially unstructured 
interview, and to generalise the findings. A further description of the interviewing process 
will be given in the following sections.    
2.4.1 Preparing for interviews 
Postholm (2005:82) emphasizes the importance of having studied the case before starting the 
interviews. This she says will help the researcher to ask questions which the informants find 
relevant, and in that way obtain more data for the project. When preparing for the interviews I 
therefore had several informal conversations with people whom I knew, who were serving or 
had served in the Norwegian Armed Forces. These conversations gave me an impression on 
the organisational structure within the army, the relationship between the different levels and 
offices, as well as a valuable insight into the culture that exists within such an organisation. 
These informal conversations became very useful for the composition of my interview guide5 
in terms of which questions to ask, and how to proceed during the interview.  
Furthermore, Andersen (2006) argues that having a good overview of the field of research 
will give the researcher a vantage point when it comes to the interview situations, as he or she 
will have a better understanding of the informants’ situation and experiences. Before starting 
collecting the empirical data, I took steps to gain more detailed knowledge of the conflict in 
Afghanistan; ISAF’s role in the conflict; and perhaps most importantly; the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ role in the conflict. I also found it necessary to gain a better understanding of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces as an organisation, and the military jargon before starting the 
interviews. This would keep the focus on the subject matter, as my informants would not need 
to stop, stop and explain what they think of as general knowledge during the interviews.  
2.4.2 Selection criteria and finding informants  
Quantitative research stresses the use of randomisation when choosing informants. This is 
important, as the aim often is to generalise the results back to the population from which the 
informants were drawn. Although qualitative studies too aim for generalisation, this is more 
                                                
5	  See appendix A.	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problematic than in quantitative research as informants are chosen because of their insight 
into, and knowledge of the phenomenon in question. As choosing informants with a special 
insight into a topic, researchers look for subjects who can give them first-hand knowledge of 
the issue in question. In order to get the information needed, however, it is important to 
choose the “right” informants for the study. I had therefore outlined criteria that the 
informants I contacted had to fulfil in order to participate in the study. The first and most 
important criterion was that the person needed experience from combat situations in 
Afghanistan. This was crucial as the aim of the study was to explore how the Norwegian 
Armed Forces apply the principle of discrimination in Afghanistan. Not all military personnel 
that had served in Afghanistan had such experiences due to rank or position. Having 
established this, it became clear that the informants I was looking for were personnel with 
operational experience. I therefore chose to interview persons with the rank of Captain or 
lower.  
Secondly, criteria such as the amount of time they had spent in Afghanistan and at what time 
they had been there were important. It is generally known that the situation in Afghanistan 
started to deteriorate in 2005/2006, and it is therefore reasonable to believe that Norwegian 
Armed Forces did not experience many hard combat situations before this time. How much 
time they had spent there also increased the chances of having been in several combat 
situations. Due to their increased possibility of combat experience, this could mean that they 
would contribute with more information. I therefore saw it as advantageous if those I 
contacted had been deployed several times.  
The process of finding informants for my study proved to be more challenging than expected. 
Due to the topic of the thesis, many of the soldiers I contacted were reluctant to talk about 
ethical issues and therefore chose not to participate. Through several informal conversations, 
it became clear that the reluctance to participate was partially due to the fact that media 
coverage of the Norwegian soldiers’ conduct had been criticized in the last couple of years6. 
Avoiding further negative reports seemed to be a concern for some of them. I was fortunate 
enough to have a few entry points that I could use in order to find informants. These were 
friends and acquaintances who worked, or had worked in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Four 
                                                
6 A report on the Norwegian soldiers in the magazine ”Alfa”, published in 2010, made the headlines in 
Norwegian newspapers claiming they had said that ”killing is better than sex”, and used battle cries referring to 
Nordic mythology to motivate themselves before battles. See for example; 
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/artikkel.php?artid=10036779.   
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of the informants were therefore recruited through my personal network. I got in touch with 
the two other informants by using the snowball method, a recruiting strategy often used in 
qualitative research to gain access to informants through already recruited informants. This is 
a method which is especially useful when the researcher has problems accessing into a 
particular milieu or a closed organisation (Tansey, 2007). 
2.4.3 Interviewing 
The interviews lasted 25 to 50 minutes, and were of a semi-structured character. They were all 
recorded and transcribed with the informants’ consent7. The advantage with semi-structured 
interviews is that they allow the researcher to alter the questions and structure during the 
interviews if the researcher believes that this will lead to relevant and important information 
that could not necessarily otherwise be obtained. All interviews, but one were conducted in 
person at various locations in Oslo and its surroundings. The last interview was conducted by 
video conference, as the informant did not live in proximity to Oslo. Leech (2002) has 
accentuated the importance of making the informants feel at ease during the interviews, I 
therefore let the informants choose the time and place for the interviews in most cases. The 
semi-structured approach allowed me to ask follow-up questions where necessary, something 
which I found particularly beneficial. I also took notes during the interviews to remind me of 
topics the informants spoke of, and that I thought especially relevant and important at the 
time.  
 
2.5 Evaluating the study 
Not all agree that validity and reliability are good criteria for evaluating qualitative research, 
as they are often associated with quantitative methods. Others, such as Hammersley, assert 
that the terms may also be applied in qualitative research, though with a few modifications 
(Bryman, 2004:276). The reality is that even though different schools of researchers have 
different wordings for the two concepts, they are all utilising some sort of evaluation criteria 
based on, or similar to validity and reliability, to test and confirm the quality of their work. In 
                                                
7	  See appendix B.	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this study I will utilise the terms validity and reliability to discuss strengths and weaknesses of 
the thesis.  
2.5.1 Validity 
According to Yin (1994:34), a valid study is one in which conclusions accurately represent 
the real world events that were studied. Yin’s statement is closely connected with strong 
internal validity, which is one of the foremost strengths of case study research. Strong internal 
validity, then, means that the research design and data of the thesis are credible. This entails 
that the data collected answers the research problem it was meant to answer, and that the 
research has been conducted according to good research practices (Bryman, 2004:274). The 
research questions in this thesis have been answered through collecting data from informants 
from the Norwegian Armed Forces. As the purpose of this study has been to answer whether 
it is possible to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in Afghanistan, and 
whether Norwegian Armed Forces are able to prepare for this challenge, interviewing soldiers 
on an operational level with first-hand knowledge of the problems is important. After all, 
having these “experts” on the subject as a source of data is essential for answering the 
research questions. I will therefore assess the internal validity of the study to be good.  
Another important criterion I would like to address here is external validity. A case study 
consists of a small number of cases, and this is one of its greatest advantages when it comes to 
obtaining thick data. However, where you can get thick and holistic knowledge from a case 
study, it will necessarily suffer from problems of representation (Gerring, 2007:43). This 
means that while case studies are strong in internal validity, they are weaker in external 
validity. A single-case study such as this one will hence have the problem of weak(er) 
external validity as it is difficult to generalise the study’s findings to a larger population. The 
generalisation of the study should however not be entirely discarded, as results from small-n 
studies can be transferred to other studies with similar cases as long as the researcher is 
careful to limit the scope of the generalisations (George and Bennett, 2005:119). It is 
therefore likely to believe that the results from this study can be transferred to other military 
units serving in Afghanistan, and also possibly to military units serving in similar COIN 
operations.  
One last issue to consider before moving on to reliability, is the issue of objectivity. 
Objectivity is closely related to internal validity and the credibility of the study. Some argue 
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that objectivity in qualitative research is never obtainable. Others, leaning toward a more 
positivistic approach to research argue that researchers should be very careful with 
interpreting an informant’s statements too subjectively, as this would weaken the credibility 
of the collected data. I have tried my best not to let my own opinions and expectations 
influence the data when I have interpreted them, and instead tried to remain critical to the 
information the informants have given me. I have also kept in mind that the informants as 
members of the Armed Forces may due to their training and long engagement with the Armed 
Forces as an institution be overtly positive to the ways the organisation work and function.   
2.5.2 Reliability 
To ensure that a study establishes a high level of reliability, the researcher should provide as 
much information about the research process as possible. Such transparency will allow others 
to assess whether the researcher has interpreted the data correctly, and thus if the results of the 
study are dependable. Transparency however might be problematic in studies using interviews 
for data gathering as this might interfere with principles of protecting the anonymity of 
informants. The transcripts from the interviews in this study have been destroyed in 
accordance with guidelines from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). I have 
however tried to improve the reliability of the study by including an extensive amount of 
citations from the transcripts, without compromising the anonymity of my informants. This 
has enhanced the transparency of the study, but in terms of replicability, the reliability of the 
study still has some weaknesses.  
2.5.3 Research Ethics 
The researcher has an important responsibility to look after the informants’ interests 
throughout the process (Kvale, 2009:52-53). All six informants that I interviewed were 
informed of the study’s topic both before agreeing to participate, and again before the 
interviews started. All informants signed an informed consent, informing them of how the 
interviews would proceed, how I would handle the data, and about their right to anonymity 
and to withdraw from the study at any point. The informed consent and the insurance that the 
informants would remain anonymous were particularly important given the topic of the study, 
and are in line with national guidelines on research ethics (NESH, 2010). I approached several 
people about participating in the study, and although many were happy to talk about the 
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subject, few actually wanted to participate in the study. Although they had different reasons 
for this, common points were the sensitivity of the topic in question, the media coverage the 
ethical side of the ISAF operation had received, and their fear that their anonymity could be 
compromised. The process of obtaining consent from the informants, handling of the 
registered information of the informants and the actual data have all been done in accordance 









This chapter will give a short introduction to the history of the ISAF mission, as well as an 
overview over the present situation in Afghanistan. Firstly however, some background 
information on ISAF is needed. I will therefore outline the background for the establishment 
of the forces, and its history starting with the 9/11 attacks. Although the Afghanistan conflict 
is a complex one with regard to participating actors, I will in the second part of this chapter 
give an account of the different actors and structures of the conflict. However, as this thesis 
focuses on ISAF and the applicability of the principle of discrimination, I will not give a 
detailed account of the Afghan ethnic groups and the numerous insurgent constellations that 
exists. Thirdly, I will outline ISAF’s mission and mandate in Afghanistan, and fourthly an 
account of the Norwegian contingent. In the last part of the chapter I will turn to the nature of 
the conflict where I will elaborate on the type of conflict that is being fought in Afghanistan, 
and ISAF’s strategies to counter the challenges this creates. 
 
3.1 Backdrop 
Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the 
Pentagon in Washington DC, NATO invoked article five of the North Atlantic Treaty for the 
first time (NATO, 2001). The United States however chose not to act through NATO when 
they within short time after the attacks launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), sending 
troops into Afghanistan. Members of NATO and other states supporting the US were instead 
invited to contribute to the operation under US leadership. OEF was part of what President 
George W. Bush called the War on Terror, seeking to find and eradicate terrorist 
organisations and terrorist cells. Al-Qaida had taken responsibility for the attacks, and it soon 
became apparent that the organisation’s roots could be traced back to Afghanistan. Although 
never recognised by the international community, the Taliban was Afghanistan´s de facto 
authority. The regime had close ties with Al-Qaida, providing the organisation with training 
facilities and funding. As the Taliban chose not to cooperate with the US after the attacks, 
toppling their regime became one of the means of seeking out Al-Qaida members and other 
terrorist cells. On October 7th 2001 more than 50 000 US soldiers with additional forces from 
their allies entered into Afghanistan. The Taliban regime fell in November 2001, and the 
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international community led by the United Nation agreed upon the establishment of an 
interim government in Afghanistan until elections could be held.  
The UN hosted Bonn conference in December 2001 and the subsequent Bonn Agreement 
established an international security force upon the request of the Afghan Transitional 
Authorities. The purpose of these forces was to help the Afghan authorities to establish peace 
and stability until they would be able to do so themselves. The United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) resolution 1386 therefore called for an International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) to be established with the purpose of securing Kabul and the surrounding areas 
(UNSC, 2001). The British-led forces were in place by February 2002 and the agreement was 
that the security forces were to take over the responsibility of these areas while the OEF 
coalition forces withdrew from densely populated areas, shifting their attention to the 
mountains where Al-Qaida members and the Taliban allegedly were hiding (Hammes, 
2006:154). The leadership of the operation changed leading nation every six months until 
August 2003, when this arrangement was not thought to give enough continuity and the 
UNSC therefore requested that NATO assumed leadership of the operation. As 2003 drew to 
an end, reports of the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan emerged. This led to the 
UNSC resolution 1510 which expanded ISAF´s mandate to the whole country (UNSC, 2003). 
As the conflict developed it became apparent that the opposition to the Afghan authorities, the 
US Army, and ISAF was growing. An increase in attacks targeted against the government and 
the international forces signalled a growing insurgency and a revival of the Taliban. The US 
Army’s retreat after the removal of the Taliban had given the organisation an opportunity to 
regroup and recruit before returning to Afghanistan. The US Army had stated that they would 
not stay and start the process of nation building in Afghanistan. Now, more than 10 years later 
state building is part of the main strategy of winning Afghan hearts and minds. The trend of a 
growing insurgency has since continued, and reports from media, international forces and 
NGOs show that security in Afghanistan is not improving (Guardian, 2011). Rather, the 
situation seems to keep deteriorating. Intending to transfer responsibility to the Afghan 
authorities, the international forces have announced that they will begin their withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 2014. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence has stated that the Norwegian 
armed forces will be out by the end of 2013. The situation after 2014 remains uncertain, as 
there has been made no concrete plans as to how many soldiers will remain for mentoring 
purposes after 2012, and for how long. Although NATO has made it clear that they are “[…] 
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clearly committed to supporting Afghanistan beyond 2014” (NATO, 2012), and that resolving 
this issue will be a top priority on the 2012 Chicago summit in May 2012, Afghanistan is 
facing an uncertain future.  
 
3.2  Identifying structures and actors 
There are two on-going military operations in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom 
Afghanistan (OEF-A) and the NATO-ISAF operation. In addition to these, personnel from the 
UN operation UNAMA are also present in most regions of the country. As all these three 
have different mandates, or in OEF’s case no formal UN mandate at all8, the relationship 
between the operations is somewhat blurred9. This section will give an overview of the most 
important actors, both those supporting the Afghan authorities, and those in opposition to it.  
3.2.1 Actors supporting the Afghan government 
The ISAF operation has 129 895 personnel and troops from 50 participant countries in 
Afghanistan as of January 201210, the US Army being the largest contributor with 
approximately 90 000 soldiers. For administrative and strategic purposes they have 
established five regional command centres; north, south, east, west and central command. 
These regional command centres are again divided into Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs), 28 in total (ISAF, 2012). PRTs are units which have the stated purpose of helping 
secure a more peaceful environment in the region which they are based and improve the 
possibilities for economic development. They have however been criticised for having too 
much focus on the military aspects of the operation, being unable to effectively cooperate and 
communicate with NGOs and the UN (Abbaszadeh et al, 2008). The PRTs are administered 
by COMISAF, which is based in Kabul.  
According to NATO and the UN, the ISAF operation has two purposes, to keep order and 
security, but also to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and assist them on their missions. 
The aim is that the Afghan government, its army, and its police forces will be able to handle 
                                                
8 The US and the coalition acted according to the UN charter art. 51, but has later been directly acknowledged by 
the UNSC through resolutions concerning the ISAF operation. 
9 The UNAMA mission is purely a monitoring and assisting mission consisting mainly of civilian staff.  
10 Numbers vary from day to day and should only be indicative.	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the country’s security issues alone when US and NATO forces withdraw. The mission has 
therefore had an increasing focus on “partnering” since 2009, meaning that ISAF’s 
responsibilities has shifted from peace keeping, to assisting the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) in their missions (NATO11). Whether this has been a success or not is yet to 
be seen, but the fact is that domestic politics in Afghanistan is not making it an easy task for 
the Afghan authorities. Different ethnic groups, local tribe leaders and power brokers are all 
adding up to this complex situation. In order to transfer the security responsibility to the 
Afghan authorities huge efforts are being made towards recruiting and training ANA and the 
Afghan National Police (ANP). Both ANA and ANP reached their targets of respectively 171 
600 soldier and 134 000 policemen by October 2011 (NATO, 2012, Livingstone & O’Hanlon, 
2012). The number of ANSF12 in February 2012 amounted to 336 806 (Livingstone & 
O’Hanlon, 2012). These are now operating with the assistance of ISAF under the NATO 
Training Mission program Afghanistan (NTM-A).  
3.2.2 Actors in opposition to the Afghan government 
The opposition mainly comprises three groups, the Taliban, the Haqqani, and Hezb-i-Islami. 
These are indigenous groups with loosely hierarchical structures that are heavily dependent on 
a civilian support network for supplies, recruiting, and intelligence and information 
campaigns (Jones, 2006). Al-Qaida comes in addition to these groups. Compared to the 
Taliban, the Haqqanis, and Hezb-i-Islami, they are organised in small units with little 
organisational structure (Burke, 2004). Al-Qaeda members often come from neighbouring 
countries such as Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, countries where they also train. While 
the Taliban, the Haqqanis, and Hezb-i-Islami seek to overthrow the current government, al-
Qaeda first and foremost seek to drive away all western influence in Muslim countries.  
In addition to these groups, there are a great number of local tribes which all have different 
interests and motivations. Warlords and Mujahedins remain strong players in Afghanistan, 
and are often motivated by economic profit and power positions. These players though, are 
not always in opposition to the state, as they are often given important positions within the 
                                                
11 Tactical directive known as Partnering directive released by General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF/CDR 
USFOR-A on 29 August 2009. No longer available online.  
12	  The ANA and the ANP make up the ANSF.	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political system. The problem is, that they often do not manage, or are unwilling to, to fulfil 
the tasks that are embedded in these positions (Schetter et al., 2007).  
 
3.3 Mandate and mission 
The initial purpose of ISAF was to help the Afghan authorities to maintain peace and security 
in the Kabul region. The mandate based on the UN charter chapter VII was established in the 
UNSC resolution 1386 upon the request from the Afghan Transitional Authority and 
authorises ISAF to take all measures necessary to fulfil their mandate. In 2003, the UNSC 
resolution 1510 expanded ISAF’s mandate, allowing the forces to expand their mission to the 
whole of Afghanistan. ISAF’s mandate has since been renewed every year by the council13.  
According to NATO, ISAF’s mission is to 
“… reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity 
and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in 
governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for 
sustainable stability that is observable to the population” (ISAF, 2012). 
More precisely this means that the ISAF mission is threefold. First of all their mission is to 
support the Afghan Government in maintaining peace and security i.e. counterinsurgency 
operations. Secondly, they are responsible for mentoring and training the ANSF, ANA and 
the ANP. These tasks are conducted by the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams 
(OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) through the 
NATO training mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A). The NTM-A is part of the NATO strategy 
adopted at the NATO Lisbon summit in 2010 stating that NATO forces would withdraw from 
Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Thirdly their mission is to assist in humanitarian relief 
programs when requested to do so by the Afghan government (Taylor, 2011).  
 
 
                                                
13	  See	  UNSC	  resolutions	  1413,	  1444,	  1510,	  1563,	  1623,	  1707,	  1776,	  1833,	  1890,	  1943,	  2011.	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3.4 The Norwegian contingent  
Considering the United States and NATO as its closest allies, Norway was one of 21 nations 
that contributed with military equipment and personnel to Operation Enduring Freedom in 
2001. In 2002, when ISAF was established at the Bonn summit in December 2001 deployed, 
the Norwegian Parliament decided to contribute to this operation too. After the 2005 national 
elections however, the newly elected social-democratic government withdrew the Norwegian 
OEF contingent choosing instead to increase its commitment to the NATO-ISAF operation 
(Stoltenberg, 2005). Today the Norwegian contingent consists of approximately 500 men and 
women from the Norwegian Armed Forces. A great number of them are stationed in 
Maymanah in the Faryab Province (Regional Command North) while a smaller number are 
stationed in Mazar-e-Sharif at the RCN headquarters and in Kabul (Forsvaret, 2011). The 
northern part of Afghanistan has been considered calmer than the southern part which borders 
to Pakistan, and international forces from both operations have encountered more resistance 
there.14 Although having been requested by NATO allies, the Norwegian Government and the 
Norwegian Army have decided not to send Norwegian troops to South-Afghanistan, 
supposedly because the government wanted to shift focus towards a more humanitarian 
approach (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2006b, Aftenposten, 2006).  
When NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation in 2003, the Norwegian contingent 
was given responsibility for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Maymanah in the 
Faryab province in North Afghanistan. They are currently cooperating with forces from 
Latvia, Macedonia and the United States. The Norwegian Army has been deployed in 
Afghanistan for more than ten years, and the environment in which they operate has changed 
dramatically over the last years as the insurgency has grown. The region has seen an increase 
in attacks by insurgent groups; the first quarter of 2011 saw a 45 per cent increase in insurgent 
attacks compared to the same period in 2010 (Landinfo, 2011). Ten Norwegian soldiers have 
so far lost their lives while on duty in Afghanistan, the largest number of losses for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces in an armed conflict since the Second World War.  
 
                                                
14	  The south-east part of Afghanistan, and especially the city of Kandahar, is regarded as the Taliban 
“heartland”. See http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/09/12/world/asia/20100912-afghan-indicators.html. 	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3.5 The nature of the conflict 
The 20th Century saw the emergence of what has been termed “total wars”. Wars that 
involved advanced and destructive weaponry and that affected whole societies. Total wars 
had an end goal different to what we see in wars today. Military victory would lead to a peace 
settlement. The 21st Century has so far seen the re-emergence of guerrilla warfare, a type of 
war where military victory alone will not lead to peace. There is no denying that that western 
armies have most experience and have mostly been trained for large scale modern wars since 
the end of World War II. The Cold War called for a conventional army that could counter an 
attack from the Soviet Union. Few western armies therefor had recent experience from 
unconventional wars when they entered into Afghanistan. Changing the Cold War “mind set” 
has therefore been necessary in most countries’ armies. Below, I will describe the type of 
conflict ISAF is fighting in, as well as give an account of the strategic choices the 
international forces have taken. I will argue that the type of conflict becomes particularly 
relevant when discussing the applicability of the principle of discrimination and vice versa.  
The term asymmetrical war is often used when referring to the Afghanistan conflict. When 
referring to an asymmetrical war, it is often spoken of as a conflict with large discrepancy 
between the parties, either in terms of technology, professionalization of the army or strategic 
thinking (Rodin, 2006:154). In an asymmetric conflict, there are often no clearly defined lines 
between who belongs to what group; there should however be a distinction between whether 
one is participating in a conflict or not (Gross, 2010:40). This touches on the issue of how to 
classify combatants. Turner Johnson (2006:660) emphasises that one should not distinguish 
between groups in terms of what they are; rather, a distinction should be drawn based on how 
they act. This is a very important point when considering the conflict in Afghanistan, as the 
ISAF forces are not fighting a regular army, but an actor who does not necessarily comply 
with international law. It is therefore natural to assume that since the enemy is not wearing a 
uniform or other signs indicating their affiliation with an organisation, a person´s behaviour 
becomes important when determining whether he is a combatant or not (Gross, 2010:39).  
3.5.1 Insurgency and counterinsurgency 
As the opposition to the Afghan authorities and the ISAF mission has grown, the conflict has 
evolved into a conflict of insurgency. In short, an insurgency is “a popular movement that 
21 
 
seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed 
conflict and terrorism” (Kilcullen, 2005:603). To achieve this they use political, religious, 
economical and informational means. A counterinsurgency then, is the authority’s tactics and 
means to counter and defeat the insurgents. Counterinsurgency is an effort to use all means 
available to try to sustain the authority’s legitimacy and further establishment (US Army FM 
3-24, 2006:1-1).  
 During the first years of the war, the Taliban were low in numbers and most had fled the 
country settling in neighbouring states, especially in mountainous areas in Pakistan bordering 
on Afghanistan. Most western military armies are trained for conventional warfare, and few 
have experienced insurgencies before. As the number of insurgents started to grow in 2003-
2004, NATO had to adapt strategies to fight “new wars”. The following section will address 
one of these, the strategy of counterinsurgency.  
3.5.2 Strategic thinking in Afghanistan – COIN and hearts and 
minds 
It has generally been argued that conflicts that develop into insurgencies demand a different 
approach to strategic thinking than conventional wars. Fighting insurgency conflicts have not 
been common for western armies in recent years, and their experiences are limited to the 
British Army’s participation in Northern Ireland and the US participation in the Vietnam War. 
Thus, most Western armies have been trained for conventional wars, not irregular warfare. 
The initial attack on Taliban in 2001 was in fact a conventional one. But, as the US Army 
withdrew after having toppled the Taliban regime, the Taliban regrouped and an insurgent 
started to develop. Lack of success at keeping the insurgents at bay led to a change of tactics 
from the international forces. In 2006 the US Army released US field manual FM3-24 
Counterinsurgency. This manual accentuates the importance of legitimacy in 
counterinsurgency wars. This echoes David Galulas’ work on counterinsurgency warfare 
from 1964 arguing that the battle for the people is the most important one in 
counterinsurgency wars (Galula, 1964:4). Winning the peoples support and trust is the key to 
success it is argued, and the counterinsurgents strive to obtain this trust whereas the 
insurgents try to undermine the peoples’ trust in authorities.  
Although not explicitly stated in field manuals and military doctrine, the concept of “winning 
hearts and minds” has become an important part of COIN strategy. It has featured 
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prominently in public statements by military leaders and politicians as well as in the media 
(Egnell, 2010:283). The overall strategy of “hearts and minds” aims to secure the local 
population’s support by using “softer” means and alternative military tools to gain legitimacy 
from the local population. Although activities associated with a “hearts and minds” strategy 
might lead to better living conditions, it must not be forgotten that such tactics are definite 
actions to achieve legitimacy for the military operations, both at a local and, often, 
international level.   
Egnell (Ibid: 288-292) has categorised the “hearts and minds” strategy into three categories; 
activities within humanitarian and development aid field, conduct in military operations, and 
information-gathering operation tactics. The second category is the most relevant here. The 
most important tactic, he says, is the minimum use of force, and the protection of civilian life 
and property. In such situations, force protection is regarded as counterproductive as it creates 
a distance between the forces and the local population.  
Such tactics in warfare have altered the requirements of soldiers as their roles have shifted 
toward more complex tasks. As such, COIN operations differ dramatically from the concept 
of total war. The new role of military personnel can be illustrated by the following quote:   
“COIN operations require officers who are effective soldiers and who can think 
strategically, who know the history of previous COIN operations and who can communicate 
clearly in the diverse situations in which they find themselves. They also require a solid grasp 
of the ethics required to fight a successful campaign” (Deakin, 2009:122).  
The expectations of today’s soldiers are higher, and their roles more difficult as they are 
constantly facing new, and perhaps previously unknown, situations. Tackling such a diversity 
of tasks requires good ethical training, as ethical choices are not only important for the given 
situation, but for the whole operation a whole. The forces’ responsibility to follow such a 




                                                

















4 Just war theory and analytical 
framework 
Just war theory is a tradition of thought that seeks to define when war is morally justified, and 
the moral limits to the use of force in war (Johnson, 2000:422). The ethics of war are 
important because it defines what is morally right to do in war, and what is not. For those 
participating in armed conflicts, having such guidelines is important as they influence how the 
participants act in certain situations. Furthermore, ethics and good conduct in war decides 
what kind of peace there will be (Ibid.:447). This chapter will take a closer look at just war 
theory, and I will apply this theory as an analytical tool on my chosen case, which is the 
principle of discrimination in Afghanistan. I will first give an introduction to just war theory, 
the principle of discrimination, and the importance this principle has in international law and 
just war theory. I will then look at four important criteria found in just war theory for 
distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants; group affiliation, clothing, 
constitution of a threat, and vulnerability. Furthermore, I will discuss how these criteria can 
be operationalized in Afghanistan. The last part of the chapter will introduce an analytical 
framework which will be used to analyse the empirical data.  
 
4.1 Just war theory 
Just war theory places itself between the Realist approach and the Pacifist approach to war. 
While pacifists reject all forms of war, arguing that there are no moral grounds to go to war, 
realists hold that morality has no place in the practice of war, or international relations in 
general. Morality, they argue, interferes with the inherent self-interest of nation states (Coates, 
1997:17-20). Just war theorists on the other hand argue that war is an evil, but sometimes a 
necessary evil. This leads to the argument that once war happens, certain moral ground rules 
should be applied (May, 2007:2-8). The theory seeks to explain what these moral rules are, 
and how they can be justified. Nabulsi (2006:44) argues that the different strands of thought 
within just war theory might explain the various military cultures that we see today. The 
problem, she says, is that the theory never agreed on the issue of whom the moral rules apply 
to, meaning that the boundaries for the terms combatants and non-combatants have never 
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been resolved. This is problematic as undefined groups make it hard to decide who belongs to 
which group. Some might therefore be left in an ethical grey area, not knowing which rights 
and obligations they have, as their affiliation to a group is not clear.  
There are two sets of principles in just war theory; the first one concerns going to war, jus ad 
bellum, and the other one conduct in war jus in bello. The principle I will be discussing, the 
principle of discrimination, belongs to the jus in bello phase of war. Jus in bello has been 
debated for as long as war has existed and the idea of rules in war can be found in writings 
dating back to ancient Greece. In The Republic for instance, Plato argues that good conduct in 
war is important as it would make it easier to reconcile with the enemy once the war ended 
(Whetham, 2011:68). Originally, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants did 
not necessarily consider the atrocities of war as the key issue, what they were concerned about 
was rather the implications the army’s conduct would have for politics later on. It was not 
until the 19th and 20th Century that the human rights perspective became codified as law. 
Although largely considered as a western tradition of thought today, just war theory has roots 
in both Islamic and Indian traditions. In fact, jus in bello and the protection of non-combatants 
was debated in the Islamic tradition as early as the Eight Century, whereas it did not become 
an important part of the western tradition until the 18th Century when International 
Humanitarian Law started to evolve (Sorabji, 2006:14).  
 
4.2 Defining key actors in war 
The principle of discrimination in just war theory rests on the assumption that it is possible to 
distinguish between different groups in war, most notably combatants and non-combatants 
(May, 2006:39). However, before I proceed to the principle of discrimination, there are some 
key terms that need to be defined. Both international humanitarian law and just war theory use 
the terms combatants, non-combatants, soldiers and civilians when referring to actors in war. 
These terms are not always easily distinguishable from each other, neither are they used in the 






According to international humanitarian law a combatant is “all members of the armed forces 
of a party to the conflict”. Combatants are the only actors who can legally can use force in 
war, but this right also entails that they loses their immunity against being attacked. As I will 
elaborate below, Walzer (2006:144-146) goes further in his definition of combatants and 
includes all those whose work directly contributes to the war effort in the term combatant.   
An armed opposition or other organized armed groups are not legally regarded as combatants, 
but past practice indicates that they do not enjoy the same privileges as civilians do. Thus they 
lose their right to be shielded from directly targeted attacks by partaking in an armed conflict 
(ICRC, 2012).  
Soldiers 
The terms soldier and combatant are often used interchangeably when referring to armed 
conflicts. However, a soldier may become a non-combatant when being injured or taken 
prisoner. A soldier who is part of the medical staff, or the pastoral services is a non-
combatant. I will use the terms “soldier” and “combatant” in this thesis, as is also the case in 
just war theory.  
Civilians 
Civilians are according to international humanitarian law, everyone who is not part of the 
armed forces. Civilians are protected from direct attacks unless they are taking part in the 
hostilities. Those who do take part in the conflict are regarded as unlawful combatants and do 
not have the right to immunity from prosecution if captured. Civilians who accompany or 
assist Armed Forces are not liable for attack, and neither do they have the right to use force. 
They should nonetheless accept the risks of being close to a military target, or a target 
associated with the war effort (Dahl, 2003:71).  
Non-combatants 
In IHL, non-combatants are persons who are at all times protected against attacks. This 
includes medical and religious personnel who are part of the armed forces. In just war theory, 
non-combatants may also refer to civilians.  
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It is not my intention to enter into the legal discussion of whether the armed opposition in 
Afghanistan should be regarded as a lawful combatant or not. I will refer to them as 
combatants, as one of the purposes of this thesis is to explore how the Norwegian Armed 
Forces apply the principle of discrimination in the conflict. I will now turn to the principle of 
discrimination and how this is formulated in IHL and JWT.  
 
4.3 The principle of discrimination in international 
humanitarian law 
One of the core principles of warfare is the principle of discrimination. It became part of 
International Humanitarian Law in 1977, when the additional protocols of the Geneva 
conventions were ratified, and it states that:  
“The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and 
combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed 
against civilians” (IRCR, 2005).  
Its intention is to distinguish those who are liable for attack from those who are not, as well as 
those who are allowed to use force, from those who are not. It especially prohibits direct 
attacks against civilian targets (Gordon, 2010). The principle of discrimination is codified in 
Articles 48, 51(2) and 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to which no reservations have been made 
(Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005). The problem is that the signatories are nation states, 
and not all armed groups identify themselves with a state, and for that reason do not 
necessarily feel responsible to international law.  
 
4.4 The principle of discrimination in just war theory 
This ancient tradition of thought has its roots in writings by philosophical and political writers 
such as Aristotle, St. Augustine, Thomas D’Aquinas, and more recently Michael Walzer. The 
traditional interpretation of the theory is that soldiers must distinguish between combatants 
and non-combatants in war. Although agreeing on this, they disagree as to which basis to 
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draw this distinction, and today, this is one of the key debates within the theory. How to make 
this discrimination has therefore become one of the key issues in just war theory. May 
(2007:97) states that in order to be able to distinguish one group from another, one has to take 
both normative and conceptual considerations into account. Contemporary definitions of 
groups and norms must therefore be taken into account when drawing such a distinction. 
When doing this, discriminating soldiers from civilians in a conflict such as the one in 
Afghanistan becomes more complex because of the overlapping characteristic between the 
different groups. Another problem with the idea of dividing actors into groups is that groups 
are not constants. Members may join or quit the group at any time, and the question then is at 
what time a person should no longer be regarded as part of a group? If group- affiliation is 
based on a member possessing a certain asset, must a person lose or give up this asset 
required for participation, or is it enough that the person in question denies affiliation with the 
group? This is particularly relevant for the situation in Afghanistan as the line separating 
insurgents from civilians such as farmers is unclear.  
In what Walzer calls the war convention he argues that non-combatants cannot be attacked at 
any time. “They can never be the objects or the targets of military activity”, Walzer argues 
(2006:151). He thus holds that all non-combatants are innocent and should be protected. He 
argues that care should be taken to ensure that non-combatants are not harmed. These 
measures involve that combatants should take risks, endangering their own lives if necessary, 
to avoid harming non-combatants (Walzer, 2006:152). According to this view soldiers have 
rights, but also obligations.  
This last point is especially important for the situation in Afghanistan. How long should a 
soldier wait until he fires if he feels threatened? Does the obligation of protecting civilians 
supersede the right to self-defence? According to Walzer, soldiers should put their lives at 
risk to avoid harm to civilians. If applied in insurgencies, should the soldier then put his own 
life at risk and withhold his fire until he is absolutely sure that the individual in question is not 
carrying hand weapons or explosives? And, what happens in a situation where the enemy is 
consistently ignoring international law and IHL in warfare? Will they succeed in their tactics? 




4.5 Four criteria for distinguishing combatants from 
non-combatants 
The most important contributor to just war thinking in recent times is Michael Walzer. His 
book Just and Unjust Wars (1977) has made a huge contribution to the debate about ethics 
and morality in war in the late 20th and early 21th Century. Walzer draws a distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants, and between soldiers and civilians; his distinctions 
however are not without problems, as I will show in the coming paragraphs. I will now 
outline four criteria that can be used to discriminate combatants from non-combatants; group -
affiliation; the constitution of a threat; vulnerability; and clothing. The next paragraphs will 
give an introduction to these criteria and how just war theorists see them.   
4.5.1 Group- affiliation 
The first criterion, group- affiliation, has been thoroughly discussed in what Michael Walzer’s 
calls “the War Convention”. Walzer believes that the rules of war are important, not only 
because it protects non-combatants, but also because they give soldiers a reassurance that 
their actions are morally justifiable in war. The meaning of the War Convention is thus “…to 
establish the duties of belligerent states, of army commanders, and of individual soldiers with 
reference to the conduct of hostilities” (Ibid.). One purpose of the thesis is to see how this 
plays out in Afghanistan.  
According to Walzer (2006:144) a soldier is someone who belongs to a state army and has 
gone through the training of such an army and thus constitutes a threat to his or her 
surroundings. The first principle of Walzer’s war convention is “once war has begun, soldiers 
are subject to attack at any time unless they are wounded or captured” (Ibid. 38). This can be 
linked to the Geneva Conventions stating that those hors de battle; medics, prisoners of war, 
wounded combatants and religious personnel are not to be attacked. Attacking soldiers, 
however, is according to Walzer (2006:144) justified as they have allowed themselves to be 
made dangerous through military training and the provision of weapons. Walzer (Ibid. 46) 
draws a distinction between soldiers at rest and soldiers in combat, thereby acknowledging 
that there are different shades to the group soldiers. He holds that the latter poses a graver 
threat than the former; but that even soldiers at rest pose such a threat that they must be 
classified as combatants nonetheless.  
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Walzer’s idea that even soldiers at rest must be classified as combatants has great implication 
for the situation in Afghanistan. His idea implies that combatants can be attacked at any time, 
and not only when they are taking part in hostilities. Identifying and distinguishing social 
groups, however, can be very difficult as they are not constants. People might belong to a 
group when performing a particular task; such as working in a munitions factory, but does not 
belong to the group “combatants” when not at work (May, 2007:97). Walzer has a certain 
notion of what is needed to belong to a group. First of all signing up for membership is one 
way of separating those who belong to a group from those who do not. The problem however, 
is whether it is possible to distinguish someone who has signed a membership to a group from 
someone who has not. Another problem is members leaving the group, how can they be 
distinguished from the members once they have left it? In the case of a soldier, Walzer argues 
that a soldier cannot leave a group because a trained soldier would always be dangerous and 
would therefore always be liable for attack (May, 2007:99-103).  
What, then, is needed to “become a member” of the group “combatants”? Can the armed 
opposition in Afghanistan be classified as combatants? And if they can, does this entail that 
they remain combatants, even if they work on their crops one day? According to Walzer, as 
seen above, someone becomes a combatant once he has entered, voluntarily or not, into a 
group and has been through military training. This entails that such a person also can be liable 
to attack if he works the crops one day. Walzer’s problem, though, is, as mentioned above, 
how to distinguish those who have left the group from those who have not. Using this 
criterion is thus very difficult, especially in Afghanistan, where signs of group- affiliation is 
even more absent than in conventional warfare, as the armed opposition does not wear visible 
signs of their affiliation. Walzer’s argument that all members of a group are to be treated the 
same indicates a rough-grained approach to the principle of discrimination; an approach 
which I will argue is not applicable in all conflicts.   
As described above, drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants in terms 
of group- affiliation is problematic. The next criterion for discussion will turn to whether 






A second criterion on how to identify combatants can be by looking at their clothing and 
equipment. Soldiers are according to IHL required to wear a uniform, or other signs that can 
identify them as a combatant, as long as they are taking part in hostilities. The use of uniforms 
allows armies to direct attacks against the opposite side and at the same time protect everyone 
else (Gross, 2010:38). In certain wars, however, the use of uniforms may be an unfair 
disadvantage for one party. This is the case in guerrilla wars. Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva conventions (1977) opens up for guerrilla warriors to shed their uniforms when 
fighting an army of occupation (Gross, 2019:36). Combatants are obliged to distinguish 
themselves from civilians, but if they cannot do this by wearing uniforms as the situation is in 
a guerrilla war, then they must do so by openly carrying their weapons during military 
operations (Ibid.). The situation in Afghanistan is comparable to a guerrilla war. Yet, the 
armed opposition is not following these rules. ISAF is then put in the difficult situation of 
having to use other criteria to identify combatants, and to distinguish these from non-
combatants. This might lead to them mistakenly targeting civilians, or put them self in a 
greater danger of harm as they are not able to recognise threats.  
4.5.3 The constitution of a threat 
The third criterion I will consider is the constitution of a threat. This criterion is the second 
answer Walzer (1977:43) gives in his discussion of the principle of discrimination. He says 
that a non-combatant is someone who is not currently engaged in warfare. Walzer uses the 
story about the naked soldier to problematise the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants. He imagines a soldier who is unaware that he is being watched take a bath in a 
river. The enemy soldier can shoot him at any point. Walzer discusses whether the soldier has 
a right to shoot him, as he is obviously not participating in the war at that moment. He will 
however participate as soon as he is done, and will then again constitute a threat to the soldier 
who is watching. Walzer raises the question whether it is legitimate to attack a soldier 
regardless of the situation. If a soldier is not posing a real threat, is it still morally justifiable 
to attack? This is his starting point for the discussion for when a soldier becomes a combatant. 
As individuals enter the military and become part of a group as soldiers, do they thereby lose 
their right of not being attacked? Or are there situations in which killing a soldier is wrong? 
Walzer argues that because he will represent a threat again, killing him is permissible, but not 
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necessarily right morally speaking. It can therefore be argued that Walzer’s view is that 
group-affiliation should be a criteria for drawing a distinction between combatants and non-
combatant, not whether they constitute a threat or not. This argument is based on Walzer’s 
thought that being a soldier entails being part of a standing army that have gone through the 
training of such an army has formed soldiers into dangerous men and women. This further 
confirms Walzer’s rough-grained approach to the principle of discrimination.  
May (2007:112) argues that taking a fine-grained approach will better grasp both the 
conceptual and moral intuitive idea of who is liable for attack or not. He therefore advocates 
that a distinction based on how people act is better than which group people belong to. A 
member of the Afghan armed opposition is likely to be trained, and as part of their tactic is to 
hide among civilians, the fact is that the person is a threat to ISAF, but does the principle of 
discrimination require a rough-grained, or fine-grained approach? Customary International 
Humanitarian International Law (IHL) is important here, as it covers individuals’ rights that 
are not fully covered in laws concerning international and non-international armed conflicts 
(ICRC, 2010). Thus, there is an overlap between just war theory principles, the Geneva 
Conventions and Customary International Humanitarian law, but there are also discrepancies. 
These discrepancies are highly relevant for my case as they address the question of what 
happens when one part of the conflict does not respect these laws, but uses the other parts 
commitment to them as part of their tactics?  
If the armed opposition is taking part in hostilities, but has neither been organised nor trained 
as an army; does this entail that the armed opposition should be treated as part of the group 
non-combatants? If so, then very few of those who do partake in hostilities in Afghanistan, or 
are affiliated with a group which does, can in fact be regarded as combatants as the armed 
opposition lacks both a clear leadership and co-ordination amongst them. This could be the 
consequence of choosing Walzer’s approach. May’s idea of a fine-grained approach, deciding 
who are combatants and who are not on a case-to-case basis, could eliminate this problem.  
The problem with May’s suggestion, however, is when a person goes from being a non-
combatant to becoming a threat. A combatant dressed as a civilian, carrying explosives 
constitutes such a threat, but identifying him is difficult. Thus is it not necessarily easy to 
make a distinction on a case-to-case basis. This example is one of the difficult situations 
Norwegian Armed Forces are encountering in Afghanistan, situations in which enforcing the 




Goodin (1985) defines vulnerability as […] essentially a matter of being under threat of harm 
[…]”. In Afghanistan, such a definition of vulnerability would lead to a too large group of 
non-combatants. As noted, May (2007:172-176) argues for a fine-grained approach, as this 
would allow distinguishing on a case-to-case basis between those who constitute a threat and 
everyone who does not constitute a threat; hence vulnerability would in many  instances apply 
to soldiers on both sides, and define them as non-combatants. More specifically, the great 
asymmetry between the parties in terms of equipment could lead to the insurgents being 
defined as vulnerable, and thus as non-combatants. The principle would offer a stronger 
protection to both civilians and soldiers. At the same time it would expose combatants to 
greater danger as their obligations towards non-combatants grew. A more “humane 
treatment”, as May calls it, would thus spare more lives. Although Walzer agrees that soldiers 
should expose themselves to greater danger in order to protect civilians, he would still hold 
that persons not constituting a danger there and then, may become a threat towards the soldier 
later and is therefore liable for attack. Considering vulnerability as a criterion may therefore 
be unreasonable with regard to accomplishing military goals. As will become clear in the 
analysis, neither of the informants mentioned this as a criterion for distinguishing combatants 
from non-combatants.  
 
4.6 Just war theory and customary international 
humanitarian law 
Rules of conduct in war differ according to what type of conflict one is dealing with. In 2001, 
as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks the US launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” on 
October 7 against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. This phase of the war, lasting until 18 June 2002, 
has been coined as an international armed conflict. When the international community 
recognized the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) on 19 June 2002 as the Afghan 
authority, the conflict was no longer between two states and hence no longer an international 
armed conflict (Geiss & Siegrist, 2011). The parties of the conflict, that are; the Afghan 
Transitional Authority with assistance from OED forces and ISAF, and the armed opposition, 
are therefore fighting in a non-international armed conflict. The rules concerning rights and 
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obligations in a non-international armed conflict are stated in Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocol II of 1977 and Customary International 
Humanitarian Law applicable in such a conflict (Geiss and Siegrist, 2011:13-16)16. In recent 
years, there have been more non-international conflicts than international conflicts. Most laws 
were, however, made for international conflicts, and therefore the laws concerning non-
international conflicts are not as strong and extensive as those for international conflicts. This 
has made customary international humanitarian law (IHL) even more relevant in non-
international armed conflicts. International humanitarian law is important in two regards; as 
not all nation states have ratified all treaties, or parts of treaties concerning the rules of war, 
they are still bound by customary international law. This means that there at least in principle 
are consequences for violating human rights17. IHL also strengthens the rights and obligations 
of belligerents fighting in a non-international armed conflict.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross has conducted a study to map out the rules of 
customary international humanitarian law (Henckaerts, 2005). The principle of discrimination 
is amongst those rules that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found to be 
part of customary IHL. This principal and other principals that concern the discussion of 
civilians and combatants that are relevant for this thesis are listed below  
o The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and 
combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be 
directed against civilians.  
o Acts or threats of violence of which the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population are prohibited. 
o Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian 
population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
o Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities. 
                                                
16	  In addition to these there are treaties concerning different aspect of war, such as the ban on cluster munitions, 
which came into power in 2010.  
17 The power of the International Court of Justice is disputed, as the UN system does not have the means to 
enforce international law.	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People may be associated with a group based on status, or on behaviour. Walzer views the 
group “combatants” as status-based rather than behavioural according to May (2007:172). In 
Afghanistan, operating with a status-based approach to the term combatant will be 
problematic. The armed opposition in Afghanistan is from time to time unidentifiable as they 
blend in with the civilian society, and it is hard to distinguish who is participating in the 
hostilities from those who are not. What it means to participate is also unclear and this is a 
central question concerning the issues of combatant and non-combatants in just war theory. 
Gross (2010:45) argues that in asymmetrical war the focus is not so much on the groups, but 
on the individual and the threat he or she poses. In such conflicts, do the stronger party have 
special responsibilities vis-à-vis the other party? Johnson (2000:59) does not call it special 
responsibilities, but he does argue that from a moral point of view that counterinsurgent 
forces have a duty to restrain their actions according to international law, even though 
insurgents fail to do so. 
 
4.7 Analytical framework 
Based on the just war tradition presented above, this section of the chapter will outline an 
analytical framework for answering the research questions, namely  
1. Whether it is possible to distinguish combatants from non-combatants in Afghanistan, and 
2. Whether it is possible to prepare soldiers for the task of drawing this distinction.  
In international humanitarian law a distinction between combatants and non-combatants is 
drawn between civilians and combatants, where civilians are all those who are not members 
of the Armed Forces. If Norwegian Armed Forces are to follow IHL, then they must be able 
to distinguish those who are member of the Armed Forces from those who are not. In the 
conflict in Afghanistan, Norwegian Armed Forces are not fighting a regular army; they are 
fighting an insurgency consisting of several opposing groups that are more or less organised 
and connected. Assuming they can apply the same indicators to identify combatants as if 
these were members of an Army, they should be able to identify them by the following 
according to international law: uniforms and membership of an armed group – this might for 




As outlined in section 4.5, The principle of discrimination in just war theory, four criteria can 
be established for identifying combatants in JWT: group- affiliation, vulnerability, the 
constitution of a threat, and clothing. Walzer and May differ in how best to draw this 
distinction and end up with two different ways of doing this. According to the interpretation 
of Walzer I abide to here, Walzer claims a group-based approach is best for distinguishing 
between combatants and non-combatants, whereas May advocates a more fine-grained 
approach, namely drawing a distinction based on behaviour. Walzer’s notion of the term 
combatant is therefore broader than May’s, who believe that as long as there can be no good 
way of defining social groups, this should not be used as a criteria for deciding who are liable 
for attack, and who are not. Drawing on these two approaches, two main groups of indicators 
can form the basis for how to draw a distinction between combatants and non-combatants: 
group-based and behaviour-based indicators. Group-based indicators are uniforms and group 
membership. The behaviour-based approach has indicators such as constituting a threat, i.e. 
carrying weapons, and behavioural pattern such as popper activity. Based on these indicators 
and approaches, I have outlined four possible outcomes for research question one.   
1. Norwegian Armed Forces use Walzer’s approach and distinguishes between combatants 
and non-combatants based on group-based indicators. If this is the case, then it is possible to 
draw a distinction in the Afghan conflict. This will also entail that COIN operations are not 
that different from conventional warfare where the indicators of the group-based approach 
traditionally have been used to distinguish combatants from non-combatants.  
2. Norwegian Armed Forces use May’s approach and distinguishes combatants from non-
combatants based on a behavioural approach. If so, this also implies that it is possible to draw 
a distinction, but that making this distinction in COIN operations differ from how it is done in 
conventional conflicts. This then becomes relevant for the second research question of 
whether it is possible to train for such conflicts.  
3. A third possible outcome can be a combination of the two approaches described above 
where the soldiers use all, or some of the criteria, to draw a distinction. This will imply that it 
is possible to draw a distinction, but that the existing criteria in IHL are not sufficient to 
provide soldiers with guidelines to do this.  
4. The last possible outcome would be that none of the criteria are being used, or can be used, 
in the conflict. Given the assumption that there are no other criteria that can be applied, this 
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entails that it is impossible to draw a distinction between combatants and non-combatants in 
Afghanistan, and thus will it be close to a realist’s conclusion.  
 
4.8 Concluding remarks 
When one part of the conflict is consistently ignoring the rules of war in order to gain the 
upper hand, this can create a dilemma for the opponent. Should he fight the opponent with the 
means he has available without resorting to the same tactics, knowing that this will put him in 
greater danger, or should he resort to the same tactics, creating a negative spiral of ethical 
conduct? This is the situation in Afghanistan today where ISAF, bound to follow IHL fights 
the armed opposition who do not necessarily abide to the same rules. Faced with an opponent 
who is not recognisable by uniforms, ISAF soldiers must be careful in their assessment of 
who is an opponent and who is not. Killing someone who is innocent will have implications, 
not only for the individual committing the crime, but also for the mission itself, as these 
implications are closely linked to a successful tactic in asymmetrical warfare. This is 
something the armed opposition in Afghanistan knows, and take advantage of. The discussion 
above comes down to whether a person should be judged by his intentions and actions rather 
than status. The problem with the first alternative is that it is too contingent to form the basis 
of a rule, the problem with the second is that the group as a whole is responsible for acting 
even though the acts may only have been carried out by parts of that group. May’s (2007:108-
112) solution is that the distinction should be made based on how people act, but if it was 
possible to distinguish between groups as in whether they were morally guilty or innocent that 










The analysis of the empirical data will be presented in this chapter, which is divided in two, 
one part for each of the two research questions. Drawing on the analytical framework 
constructed in chapter four “Just war theory and analytical framework”, I will first turn to 
how Norwegian Armed Forces distinguish combatants from non-combatants, and whether it is 
possible to make this distinction at all in the Afghan conflict. Here, I will examine the 
indicators described in chapter four, and see which ones the Norwegian Armed Forces are 
using. The second research question seeks to find out whether Armed Forces can prepare for 
moral dilemmas, and this will be the topic of the second part of this chapter. Some final 
remarks on the results from the analysis of both research questions will be offered at the end 
of the chapter before turning to chapter six “Conclusions and implications”.  
      
5.1 Distinguishing combatants from non-
combatants in Afghanistan 
In section 4.7, where I outline my analytical framework for the thesis, I identify two groups of 
indicators that can be used to distinguish combatants from non-combatants in Afghanistan: 
group-based indicators, and behaviour-based indicators. The purpose of this section is 
therefore to map out which indicators the Norwegian Armed Forces are using, and which of 
these two groups, if any, the indicators fit into. Identifying such indicators is important, as this 
will point to whether international humanitarian law as it stands today is applicable in the 
Afghan conflict.  
One of the question of how they distinguished combatants from non-combatants, four out of 
six informants responded that this could be done by looking at what a person was wearing, 
more precisely if the person in question had one of the following objects: maps, optics, and 
communication devices. This, they said, combined with contextual variables, could lead to a 
positive identification, and thus the right to open fire. Though enemy combatants are not 
wearing proper uniforms, the answers show that clothing is still a factor when distinguishing 
and identifying combatants from non-combatants. It can therefore be argued that one indicator 
the Norwegian Armed Forces are using is clothing.  
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Furthermore, the soldiers spoke of visible threats such as weapons and explosives. People 
carrying such items were perceived as threats, and thus used as a way of distinguishing 
between combatants and non-combatants. Nevertheless, a second indicator, whether someone 
constitutes a threat can be identified. This is a very difficult criterion to utilise as one 
soldier’s perception of a threat might be different from another, something I will come back to 
in section 5.3, when I discuss whether it is possible to prepare the soldiers for the challenges 
they face when applying the principle of discrimination in Afghanistan.  
People carrying items such as weapons or explosive devices as mentioned above can be 
perceived as a direct threat. I will therefore argue that a third main indicator can be identified: 
behaviour, a term I will describe as behaviour that can lead to a threat; thus is behaviour a sort 
of an indirect threat. The informants often spoke of context in interviews, and this indicator is 
closely connected to context. There are blurred boundaries between this criterion and the 
criterion of whether someone constitutes a threat. So-called “poppers”18 will lead to a positive 
identification of an enemy. Although possibly carrying objects as maps, optics, and 
communication devices these might not always be visible. Poppers are still regarded as a case 
of hostile intent. All six informants spoke of other peoples’ behaviour as a means for 
distinguishing combatants from non-combatants in other settings, although in many 
circumstances this was only one of the factors leading to a positive identification. Such 
behaviour would be people observing them from a distance, people walking back and forth in 
“unnatural places”, as one informant put it, and someone speaking on the phone frequently as 
if reporting to someone in a special setting. I will therefore argue that the Norwegian soldiers, 
at least partially, use an indicator of behaviour to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants.  
From the empirical evidence collected for this study I have therefore identified three 
indicators for distinguishing combatants from non-combatants that are being used by 
Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan; clothing; the constitution of a threat; and 
behaviour. These three indicators are a strong indication that it is possible to apply the 
principle of discrimination in the Afghan conflict, and this partially answers the first research 
question of the thesis. The next section of the chapter will take each of the above-mentioned 
indicators and see to what extent they are used by Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan, 
                                                
18 Insurgent scouts, often placed on top of hills or mountains.  
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and whether they are, alone, or in combination with others, able to make soldiers apply the 
principle of discrimination successfully.  
   
5.2 Applying the principle of discrimination 
Having identified three criteria in the previous section that the Norwegian Armed Forces use, 
I will now analyse the data material to find out if the indicators described in section 5.1, 
namely the constitution of a threat, behaviour, and clothing make it possible to distinguish 
combatants from non-combatants. This will lead to a final answer to research question one, 
whereby I will be able to identify which of the four possible outcomes described in section 
4.7 that applies in this case. 
One of the three criteria I discussed in the previous section was the constitution of a threat. 
This was the most important criterion used by the informants to identify combatants. May 
(2007) argued that the advantage of using such a distinction is that the soldier decides on a 
case-to-case basis, rather than treating everyone belonging to one group the same. This, May 
argues, requires that the soldier stops and think in every situation before he acts, something I 
will argue can both be an advantage and a disadvantage. Making the soldier think before 
acting surely is a good thing, but deciding on a case-to-case basis might also lead to wrong 
decisions, as there might be little or no time to reflect on the matter. In addition, there is also 
the question of how much responsibility that can be expected of a soldier when it comes to 
drawing such a distinction.   
When asked how they identify combatants, four of the respondents I interviewed answered 
quite similarly. First of all, identification, they said, was always context specific. There would 
always be signs, circumstances that would make them suspicious. This could be everything 
from people walking restlessly back and forth, to people who seemed to be in places where 
they did not belong. Village streets going from pulsating to empty was another. Such signs, 
they argued, indicated that something was about to happen, or that there were insurgents 
nearby. The soldiers needed a positive identification that a person was a combatant in order to 
legally open fire. If a person attacked, that would be a positive identification, but the 
respondents also referred to objects such as weapons, communication devices, maps and 
binoculars as indicators for positive identification.  
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In situations were they would have a positive identification, the soldiers claimed that although 
having observed items such as those above, or feeling threatened, they often did not open 
direct fire at first. They would in many situations fire warning shots to be absolutely certain 
that it was an enemy combatant. For as one respondent put it: “There is always that two per 
cent chance that it is a civilian”. This statement entails that objects such as weapons, 
communication devices, binoculars, and maps as indicators of a positive identification, which 
according to ROE19 gave them the right to open fire, were not necessarily trusted as good 
indicators of insurgents. This may indicate that the criterion of clothing as a means of 
distinguishing combatants from non-combatants therefore is not applicable in Afghanistan.  
One of the informants differed from the other informants on nearly all accounts. He gave an 
entirely different answer to the question of how he identified combatants. He stated that one 
simply cannot identify enemy combatants in Afghanistan. In other words, he found it 
incredibly difficult, something that the quote below illustrates.  
“You can´t identify them before they have actually picked up their weapon and are 
shooting at you. There are circumstances that make you suspect that they are the enemy, but 
you can never be sure before they actually shoot at you. And, even then you can´t be sure 
they´re the enemy. In Afghanistan, it is very complex. How shall I put it (…) It is hard to map 
out who are the enemy, and who are not, because there are so many interests out there; 
people with local intentions. They can work with us, with the Taliban, with Al-Qaida, or (…) 
they don´t have any ideological thoughts behind their actions at all. They are power brokers 
[...]”. 
The clothing criterion is closely connected with both the criterion of group-affiliation, and the 
criterion of whether someone constitutes a threat or not. Clothing can help separating people 
into groups and make it easier for soldiers to identify combatants. However, as the opposition 
does not wear uniforms in Afghanistan, objects and equipment are used as indication of a 
person being a combatant. This, however, does not make it certain that the person belongs to 
the armed opposition, as there are so many actors involved in this conflict. A man carrying a 
weapon might be part of a local militia and thereby have permission to carry it. This man may 
look exactly the same as an insurgent in terms of clothing. It is therefore difficult to argue that 
clothing as a criterion for drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants is 
                                                
19	  ISAF ROE are classified, hence is all information about ROEs in this thesis based on what informants have 
told me.	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satisfactory. Clothing and objects can be helpful in identifying combatants in Afghanistan, but 
it cannot alone be used to draw a distinction unless soldiers do, as May (2007:97) argues they 
should, and take normative and conceptual considerations into account. The criterion must 
therefore always be seen in connection with context. The objects that the informants 
mentioned are normal equipment which is as likely to be utilised by non-combatants as 
combatants.   
As seen above, there are differences between the informants in terms of how they perceive the 
difficulty of identifying combatants. I will argue that this is due to their different experiences 
in Afghanistan. One of the requirements for an informant to participate in this study was that 
he or she had been in combat situations in Afghanistan. All fulfilled this requirement, but the 
kinds of combat situations they had been in differed greatly. Those informants referred to 
above who mentioned objects and weapons as a way of distinguishing had compared to the 
other two informants not experienced close combat situation in which they had been forced to 
make split-second decision of whether a person constituted a threat or not. These four 
respondents had found drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
manageable. Although these situations were often context specific, the situations the 
respondents had been in often paralleled situations found in conventional warfare. The 
episodes the two other informants spoke, on the other hand, were situations characteristic for 
insurgencies. Based on this it can be argued that it was less complex to apply the principle of 
discrimination in situations resembling conventional warfare, than insurgencies. The fact that 
the soldiers often outnumbered the insurgents, and the attacks were often launched from a 
long distance, meant that they had more time to think and reflect on how to react to this threat 
than if the enemy was close by. As one respondent said; “when we were attacked from such a 
distance I became more relaxed as the danger was not that high. We could stand upright and 
everything”. A feeling of not being too close to the enemy, gave them better time to react and 
to communicate.  
The same four informants as referred to above also argued that they had good guidelines to 
follow concerning the principle of discrimination, and that this contributed to overcome the 
challenges discussed above. But, if taking the statements of the two other informants into 
consideration these guidelines are good enough until a more difficult scenario appears. Thus, 
one can assume that these guidelines are not satisfactory for soldiers in Afghanistan, as they 
do not apply to all sorts of situations.   
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This does however contradict the previous claim that obtaining a positive identification of a 
combatant was not that much of a challenge. Another respondent claimed that one could 
never be certain, but that:  
“What it comes down to, no matter what, is not what you are allowed to do, legally, 
but what you can live with. (…) And what is it that I can live with? (...) It has a lot to do with 
intuitive actions. One has to be sure that the intuitive actions one performs during a split-
second coincide with those guidelines one has been given in the ROEs. If you visualise it over 
and over again before you deploy to an area of operation, then you know that you most likely, 
but one can of course never be certain, that your intuitive actions will coincide with those 
rules and guidelines. But it is hard, because you don´t normally have that much time to go 
through such reasoning before you have to make that decision”.  
When unsure of whether a person was a combatant or not, the soldiers followed certain steps 
to make sure they took the right decision. By using hand signals, local languages and warning 
shots before actually opening directed fire, they hoped to identify who were combatants and 
who were not, when feeling threatened. Persons not responding on repeated warnings, 
including warning shots could be perceived as a threat, and any hostile actions towards such 
threats would be regarded as self-defence.  
The respondents referred to the criteria of clothing, the constitution of a threat, and 
behaviour, but as can be seen from the analysis above it is not necessarily that the criteria they 
say they are using actually work in practice. The criterion of clothing for instance was second-
guessed by the informants, as they would always fire warning shots before they were able to 
draw a distinction. It would however help them in some situations, but was then always seen 
in context with other circumstances. The two other criteria, behaviour and the constitution of 
a threat were more relevant for the soldiers as they would indicate threats, bot indirect and 
direct threats. This leads to the conclusion that outcome three from section 4.7 is the outcome 





5.3 Is it possible to prepare for moral dilemmas in 
COIN?  
In 2006 the Norwegian Armed Forces initiated a new plan for further integration of ethics in 
the Ministry of Defence and its underlying department services. As seen below, the plan 
pointed towards a stronger focus on ethics within the field 
“Dilemma training and the integration of problems of an ethical and attitudinal 
character in exercises and projects, are useful means to prepare leaders, co-workers, and 
military personnel for relevant challenges they might encounter during far more difficult 
circumstances” (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2006a)20.  
Now, the question is whether they have fulfilled the aim of preparing the Armed Forces 
through a more comprehensive approach to ethics education. To answer research question 
two, whether it is possible to prepare soldiers for COIN operations, the informants were asked 
a series of questions of how their training had been, what they thought of it, how it 
corresponded with real-life situations in Afghanistan, and their ability to cope with morally 
demanding situations based on this training.  
The analysis concerning the first research question found that making this distinction in 
Afghanistan is nearly impossible in many situations, unless a person is in fact being directly 
attacked. The soldiers I interviewed emphasised that there were circumstances that would 
make it easier to come to a conclusion, but that in the end they could never be certain that the 
targeted person was not a civilian. This section seeks to answer the second research question 
of whether it is possible to prepare soldiers for moral dilemmas in COIN conflicts. By 
matching the soldiers’ experiences with their training and their combat experiences in 
Afghanistan I seek to detect missing factors, and factors that can be improved in the pre-
deployment training concerning morally and ethically difficult situations.  
All informants expressed an overall satisfaction with their general training and their 
deployment to Afghanistan. However, when asked in detail about their ethical training before 
deploying their answers differed. All had undergone theoretical training in the Law of Armed 
Conflict and NATO’s ROE, followed up with thought experiments and discussion in 
classrooms, but also in smaller groups within their units. Especially discussing in groups, they 
                                                
20	  My translation	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argued was of great value both before deploying and during their deployment, as it gave them 
the opportunity to reflect on difficult issues in an environment where everyone was in the 
same situation. For some, one informant said, the theoretical training they went through was 
sometimes the first experience the youngest soldiers had with discussing ethical dilemmas as 
such, and it was important he thought that this started as early in training as possible so that 
they had a good understanding of the theoretical principles before starting with practical 
training. Although one respondent expressed that he thought the soldiers could have 
benefitted from more theoretical training, he had found the theoretical training satisfactory. It 
was the practical training he thought needed most improvement, and would be most helpful in 
the field.  
When it came to the practical training, one respondent claimed not to have gone through any 
practical training relating to ethical dilemmas at all before deploying to Afghanistan. This 
answer clearly diverged from the other respondents, even with those who had served in the 
same unit. This respondent, it should be noted, was the one with the least experience, and the 
shortest timed served in Afghanistan – only three months. The other five respondents spoke of 
the practical training as an important integral part of their military and ethical training. They 
went through scenarios and different cases with the intention of putting the ROEs into 
practice. This training was seen as very important as it helped the soldiers understand the 
theory better. The practical training would try to mirror real-life situations in Afghanistan, so 
that the soldiers would be better prepared for certain situations once deployed. Some of these 
training schemes, one respondent told me, would change as intelligence reports got back from 
Afghanistan. This entailed that the units had to adapt to new situations and scenarios, and 
hence change their training continuously. This has as I see it both an advantage and a 
disadvantage. The advantage is that changing the training continuously allows the soldiers to 
train for a number of different scenarios, but at the same time, there is a possibility that this 
could lead to a superficial insight into each situation. For, the more the respondents practiced 
one scenario or dilemma that could occur in a certain situations, the better did they say they 
knew how to react to such situations in Afghanistan.  
The respondents disagreed on whether the practical training was relevant for what they faced 
in Afghanistan. Three respondents found that the training coincided very well with real-life 
situations; one even said it was as realistic as possible. Yet another respondent emphasised 
that he had gone through good training, and that this training did in most circumstances reflect 
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what he had encountered in Afghanistan, but that he had also been in situations that were 
nothing like what they had trained for and found that very challenging. He mentioned one 
situation outside a village where his partner had been faced with a dilemma. Someone had 
approached them from a distance by car, and although they both had signalled him to stop, the 
car did not do so until very close to them, about 10-15 meters. His partner, he said, had been 
in doubt of whether to shoot or not, but had in the end decided on the latter. The informant 
was asking himself what he would do in the same situation, because after all, this kind of 
situation would have come under the right of self-defence, as the soldiers would have felt 
threatened. Such scenarios he said were the hardest scenarios they could encounter, and which 
really put them in a moral dilemma, as they had no idea of who were driving the car. 
Handling such situations he thought to be very hard as training for split-second decisions is 
challenging. In the end, he told me, it was all about protecting yourself and your team.  
The last informant, the one I described differed from the others on all accounts, had a very 
different view on the relevance of the training compared to the others. He had like the 
informant above experienced more demanding situations than the other four, and as you can 
see from the citation below, he had a less positive view on whether the training coincided 
with real-life events; 
“You can never be prepared for war, you can try, but you can never be well enough 
prepared. Those elements you find in war, you don´t get them in training. The training can be 
close to what you find in war, but you can never practice for war. Of course, I´d wish that the 
ROE education were much better than it is, but that goes for so many things. The training was 
OK”.  
One of the reasons he gave for this was the ever-changing scenario, there would always be 
another element added to a situation that had not been envisioned during training. As can be 
seen from the citation below, this was a major challenge:  
“It is the contextual variations that make it so hard to compare situations. You have to 
interpret those specific situations that you are in. It has to be done fast. Very fast. And it´s 
very, very, hard. So you are dependent on ethical values and principles that make your 
intuitive actions right. Or right enough”. 
This respondent had experienced being in a situation where he had to determine whether a 
person actually constituted a threat or not. He describes this as very difficult, and the fact that 
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this decision had to be taken in a split-second made it even harder. On the question on 
whether he found the training they had good enough he replied: 
“It should be more. […] So that you have more training and more reference points to 
situations. Because in the end, if something goes wrong and you´re not within ROE 
guidelines, then you have a problem. And you have to be sure that you know the guidelines. If 
you are not, then... then you hesitate. If the worst comes to the worst, this affects you or 
someone around you because you can´t deal with the situation, or because you didn´t react 
the right way. If you don´t react, and someone dies on your side, or you do react, but too 
quickly and kills someone you shouldn´t have, then it´s hanging over you […]”. 
He further emphasised that more training could be beneficial as “It does make it easier for the 
soldiers.  […]to actually use the ROEs, and learn how to react correctly. But again, it is what 
you have time for. And you just don´t have time for it before deployment”. 
Those who had experienced such situations said that making the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants was very hard; in fact one informant termed it as impossible. 
Although they had discussed the topic, the four others had not been in similar situations. 
Thus, there is no way of knowing if they would react differently than the two informants. If 
such a situation had occurred, they might have found it equally unsettling and hence changed 
their thoughts on how hard drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants is.  
As seen above, the informants differed in terms of how useful they found the ethical training. 
It can seem as those who had been in more difficult situations than the others were more 
critical of the training, but it is not certain that this is the reason. There might be other 
variables influencing this, that I have not touched upon in this study.  
 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
From the above analysis it is clear that the main challenge the Norwegian soldiers are facing 
when distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants in Afghanistan is to identify 
enemy combatants. This is especially hard, as insurgents are sometimes indistinguishable 
from civilians in terms of clothing. The challenges are also greater in densely populated areas 
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where there are civilians present, as the insurgents know to use to their advantage. Below are 
some concluding remarks on the two research questions that were analysed above.  
5.4.1 Research question one 
The first research question “is it possible to distinguish combatants from non-combatants in 
Afghanistan” was answered by mapping out which criteria the Norwegian Armed Forces 
were applying in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the application of the criteria was studied to see if 
they could be placed in a group-based approach, a behaviour-based approach, a combination 
of the two former, or whether they could be applied at all.   
I found that the Armed Forces were largely using a behaviour-based approach, but that they 
also used one criterion from the group-based approach. Hence, outcome three from section 
4.7; a combination of both approaches is used, but with a majority of the criteria coming from 
the behaviour-based approach. This suggests that of the two approaches to the principle of 
discrimination within JWT, the behaviour-based approach is the most relevant in the conflict 
in Afghanistan. Whether this is true in other conflicts as well, will be further discussed in 
chapter 6. A permanent change from a group-based approach to a behaviour-based approach 
in conflicts will mean that soldiers need new guidelines, and perhaps new ways of preparing 
for such conflicts.  
5.4.2 Research question two 
Research question two, whether it is possible to prepare soldiers for applying the principle of 
discrimination in counterinsurgencies, was answered by analysing and comparing the 
soldiers’ answers from the interviews about training. The analysis above shows that in COIN 
operations such as the one in Afghanistan, the principle of discrimination is nearly impossible 
to apply with certainty. The only sure way of knowing that you are targeting a combatant is if 
the combatant is in fact attacking you. Other threats, however plausible they are, may in fact 
turn out to be a non-threat as with the incident with the vehicle depicted above. With such 
threats it comes down to the soldier’s perception of the situation, and his or her ability to 
make the right decision in that very moment. Such situations, the analysis suggests, are hard 
to handle, and difficult to prepare for. The analysis suggests that soldiers find it easier to 
handle situations if they have repeatedly trained for a similar situation while at home. Hence, 
would it be advantageous for the Norwegian Armed Forces to train more for ethically and 
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morally challenging situations in pre-deployment periods. I will return to this, and other 
practical implications from the study in section 6.2.  
The informants’ answers to the question about training differed. Four of them found the 
training to be satisfactory, whereas the two others meant that there could have been more 
emphasis on the ethical aspects of the training, both theoretically and practically. As these two 
informants were the same ones that had experienced ethically demanding situations I draw the 
conclusion that those who have experienced situations where they have had to make a split-
second decision on whether someone was a combatant or non-combatant, or a threat, felt that 
there could have been more focus on such situations during pre-deployment training. Thus is 
it a need for a greater focus on ethical training as those who actually encounter such situations 












6 Conclusions and implications 
In this study I have explored whether the principle of discrimination is applicable in the 
conflict in Afghanistan, and whether it is possible to prepare soldiers for moral dilemmas 
when applying the principle in a counterinsurgency conflict such as the one in Afghanistan. 
The study has been of a qualitative nature and I have used semi-structured interviews as a 
method for collecting data. Six members of the Norwegian Armed Forces on an operational 
level have participated in the study and the interviews with these soldiers form the basis for 
my analysis.  
In section 4.7 I mapped out four possible outcomes for research question one. The first 
outcome was that the Norwegian Armed Forces were using a group-based approach based on 
Walzer’s notion of just war theory (JWT). The second, a behaviour-based approach, as seen 
in May’s interpretation of the principle in JWT. The third outcome was a combination of the 
two first approaches and implied that it is possible to distinguish combatants from non-
combatants. The fourth outcome was that that the Norwegian Armed Forces were not able to 
use any of the criteria, and that drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
in Afghanistan is impossible.  
In the analysis concerning research question one I found that Norwegian Armed Forces are 
using three criteria when distinguishing combatants from non-combatants; the constitution of 
a threat, behaviour, and clothing. The clothing criterion is from the group-based approach, 
and the criteria of constitution of a threat and behaviour are from the behaviour-based 
approach. This leads to the conclusion that it is outcome three that is being used in 
Afghanistan. This entails that Michael Walzer’s approach is less significant today than it used 
to be. It can be assumed that this has to do with the type of war being fought, and that his 
approach therefore is not applicable in counterinsurgencies. Larry May’s approach on the 
other hand is more relevant, as the majority of criteria being used are behaviour-based. The 
theoretical implications of this will be outlined in the following section. 
Situations and circumstances put into context will in most cases help soldiers distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants. But then again, as one soldier mentioned;  
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“there are these situations where you have a split second to decide how to act. And 
these situations are hard and difficult. There is always a chance that you are wrong, but we 
are at war and the decision has to be taken. Sometimes it might be the wrong decision”.  
The analysis of research question two found that four of the soldiers I interviewed perceive 
their ethical education and training as sufficient for the situations they encounter in 
Afghanistan. The two last informants expressed that they would have preferred a stronger 
focus on the ethical education, both theoretically and practically. Those who wanted more 
ethical education as part of the pre-deployment had experienced situations in which they did 
not feel prepared. Although one should be careful to generalise from small-n qualitative 
studies, it can be concluded that it is difficult to prepare for situations which are characteristic 
for insurgency warfare.  
It is important to remember that these results do not represent the experiences of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces as a whole, only the experiences of the six informants I have 
interviewed. The results can however be indicative for the rest of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces operating under the same circumstances, and even other states’ armed forces in similar 
types of warfare. For as George and Bennett (2005) argues, case studies can have contingent 
validity, meaning that the results can be transferable to similar units in similar situations. 
Thus, it is not unlikely that the results in this study can be transferred to other soldiers in 
similar COIN operations.  
  
6.1 Theoretical implications of the study 
The first part of the analysis focused on whether it is possible to distinguish combatants from 
non-combatants in Afghanistan. In this section I will outline the theoretical implications of the 
study. Based on the data I have collected and the analysis above, it is clear that the framework 
of IHL is insufficient for determining who are legitimate targets in Afghanistan, and who are 
not. Just war theory, which has laid the foundation for the international framework, is also 
suffering from the ability to solve some of the dilemmas that Norwegian Armed Forces are 
encountering in Afghanistan. Both IHL and JWT frameworks are developed with 
conventional warfare in mind, and in COIN operations, these frameworks are not giving the 
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soldiers good enough guidelines for combat situations. This can lead to the following 
recommendations: 
While just war theory as interpreted by Michael Walzer argues that group-affiliation is 
sufficient as a criterion for distinguishing combatants from non-combatants, May argues that 
soldier instead should use a fine-grained approach and rather distinguish based on criteria of 
threat and behaviour. I have found that in Afghanistan, soldiers cannot be asked to draw a 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants based on group-affiliation only. This 
requirement is not sufficient in the Afghanistan conflict, and can lead to non-combatants and 
civilians being unintentionally targeted.  
It can be argued that international humanitarian law is not a sufficient framework for soldiers 
in counterinsurgency conflicts. Changing IHL on the other hand is easier said than done. It is 
important that there are general rules that are applicable for all types of conflicts. Changes 
however, may be done other places, for instance can the terms combatants and non-
combatants and the like be better operationalized in Rules of Engagement to better help 
soldiers identify and distinguish between them. One problem with this suggestion though is 
that it may put the soldiers in a more difficult situation with regard to their vulnerability. It 
might put a lot of pressure on them if too much responsibility is given to soldiers.   
  
6.2 Practical implications of the study 
The second part of the analysis focused on whether it is possible to prepare soldiers for the 
challenges they face in counterinsurgencies with regard to drawing a distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants. The analysis found that although the informants found the 
training to be satisfactory, it did not prepare them for the most difficult situations in 
Afghanistan. The most difficult situations being those typical for COIN operations. It was 
impossible to decide whether a person was an insurgent or not because of the similarity with 
the civilian population. The crucial question was; what can be done to reach this “end state” 
where soldiers are well enough prepared to face these moral dilemmas? Or, at least feel better 
prepared than they are today. The analysis suggests that the most important factor for 
successfully coping with such situations is experience. Situations that the soldiers had 
repeatedly practised for were those situations they knew best how to react intuitively to. This 
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entails that more focused, and repeated training for situations with difficult moral dilemmas 
will lead the soldiers to better be able to make the right decision in a real-life event. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that a better ability to make the right decision will lead to a 
better-integrated strategy within the COIN framework, and hopefully an improved over-all 
success rate.  
The analysis also found that those who had been deployed several times, found it easier to 
identify combatants as they started to recognise the enemy’s behavioural patterns. Today 
deployment time for Norwegian Armed Forces to Afghanistan is on average six months. This 
is short compared to other states’ Armed Forces, such as the US. However, in terms of 
recognising patterns of behaviour, longer deployments, and more experienced units can be an 
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A  Interview guide 
Innledningsspørsmål 
1. Hvor lenge har du jobbet i forsvaret? 
2. Hvilken rang har du? 
3. Hva er din rolle? 
4. Hvor mange ganger har du vært deployert til Afghanistan? 
a. Hvor lang tid har du da tilbrakt der til sammen? 
5. Hvordan opplevde du Afghanistan-oppholdet ditt? 
 
Opplæring og trening 
6. Har du trening i det å håndtere situasjoner der du blir stilt ovenfor dilemmaet om du 
har rett til å bruke makt eller ei? 
7. Kan du fortelle litt om hva denne opplæringen har bestått av? 
a. Hvilke situasjoner har dere trent på i den praktiske delen? 
b. Kan du fortelle litt om den teoretiske opplæringen dere har hatt? 
8. Ble dere satt inn i ”rules of engagement? 
a. Hvis ja; hva slags innføring? 
b. Hva vet du om reglene? 
 
Faktiske opplevelser i Afghanistan 
9. Hva slags nytte hadde du av den teoretiske opplæringen? 
a. På hvilken måte? 
10. Og hva med den praktiske opplæringen? 
11. Hvilke muligheter har du for å gjøre egne fortolkninger av retningslinjene? 
a. Hvis ja; hva tenker du om situasjoner der du må ta avgjørelsene? 
12. Hvem er det som tar avgjørelsene om hva som skal gjøres i slike situasjoner? 
a. Gitt at det er rom for personlige fortolkninger, føler du at situasjoner blir 
behandlet ulikt fra ansvarlig til ansvarlig, og situasjon til situasjon? 
13. Kan du fortelle litt om hvordan du identifiserte stridende? 
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a. Har de noen ytre kjennetegn dere kan identifisere dem ut fra? 























B  Informed consent 
Forespørsel om deltakelse i form av intervju i forbindelse med min masteroppgave. 
I forbindelse med min masteroppgave i Statsvitenskap ved Universitet i Oslo søker jeg våren 
2012 etter personer som vil la seg intervjue om de norske soldatenes opplevelse av krigen i 
Afghanistan.  
Formålet med oppgaven er å belyse hvilke etiske utfordringer norske soldater møter i en 
asymmetrisk konflikt der fienden ikke alltid er like synlig.  
For å gjennomføre dette trenger jeg fem personer som har tjenestegjort i Afghanistan de siste 
årene, og som har kamperfaring derfra. Intervjuene vil ta ca 30-45 minutter og vi kan sammen 
bli enige om møtested for intervjuet. Under intervjuet kommer jeg til å ta notater. Intervjuet 
vil og bli tatt opp med båndopptaker.  
Deltakelse i prosjektet er frivillig, og du kan når som helst trekke deg. Alle opplysninger vil 
bli behandlet konfidensielt og det vil ikke bli mulig å identifisere hvem som har deltatt i 
prosjektet når man leser oppgaven. Ved prosjektets slutt (august 2012) vil opptakene og 
notatene bli slettet.  
Vedlagt finner du en samtykkeerklæring. Om du ønsker å delta i prosjektet signerer du denne 
og returnerer den til meg.  
Har du spørsmål kan jeg kontaktes på telefon, eller mail. 
Prosjektet er meldt inn til Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelige Database (NSD).  
 
 
Med vennlig hilsen,   
Eli Foss 
Masterstudent ved Institutt for statsvitenskap, UIO.  
 
Jeg vil med dette bekrefte min deltakelse i prosjektet om ”Ethics and moral in Afghanistan”.  
 
 
Signatur……………………..  Telefon/email………………… 
